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Abstract
This master thesis overviews the fields of Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) and Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) and their role
in future transport. It describes the key challenges in security with a focus
on low-level attacks and vehicle platooning applications. It points out that
denial of service attacks could prove particularly disruptive and dangerous
in a vehicular network.
The project focuses on prevention, detection and mitigation of denial of
service attacks in a vehicle platoon. To achieve this, a simulator was created
using MATLAB and Simulink that can reproduce the physical workings
of a vehicle platoon as well as the wireless communication between the
vehicles and the possibility of malicious interference. Defence methods are
implemented and tested against jamming attacks. These include methods
of interference reduction, data redundancy and warning systems based on
on-board vehicle sensors.
The results presented are positive and successful in increasing a vehicle
platoon’s resiliency to attacks. It is the hope of the author that this work
along with the simulating environment created, will provide an incentive
for further development and examination.
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Preface
Ad hoc networks have long been envisioned as the solution in scenarios
where traditional infrastructure based communication is not practical or
desirable. With the establishment of wireless communication technologies
and the increase of computing power on small devices, Mobile Ad hoc
Networks (MANETs) have found many important applications while
research in the field is ongoing.
An application of particular interest is Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
(VANETs) for the realization of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS). ITS
have been described since 1939 when General Motors presented their
vision for the future where “driver-less” vehicles moved under automated
control. Currently, advances in computing technologies, microelectronics
and sensors have brought this vision closer with many of its aspects
already in widespread use. With the vehicle population exceeding 1 billion
worldwide in 2010, Vehicular networks have the potential of being one
of the most important applications of Ad hoc networking. The scale and
special nature of such a network presents several challenges in regards
to communications and security that need to be addressed in this new
perspective.
Vehicle platooning is an especially attractive application of ITS that
allows vehicles to operate autonomously while providing large benefits in
energy consumption, road congestion and safety. For the implementation
of such an application the possibility of incidental or malicious interference
needs to be addressed and the development of a resilient communication
network is imperative.
xv
xvi
Part I
Introduction
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Chapter 1
Background
1.1 Intelligent Transportation Systems
1.1.1 Overview
As defined by the European Union, “Intelligent Transportation Systems
(ITS) are systems in which information and communication technologies
are applied in the field of road transport, including infrastructure, vehicles
and users and in traffic management and mobility management, as well as
for interfacing with other modes of transport” [24].
The IEEE defines Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) as "those
utilizing synergistic technologies and systems engineering concepts to
develop and improve transportation systems of all kinds" [14].
In short, the field is focused on the utilization of communications and
information technologies to improve on the use of transportation networks.
ITS have applications in all modes of transport (see figure 1.1):
• Automotive applications
In the automotive industry, automation has long been envisioned as
the future. The beginning of modern, mass production of cars can
be traced back to 1914. Just 25 years later General Motors presented
their vision for the future of transportation in the 1939 World’s Fair
in New York. At that time cars were already very popular but the
development of infrastructure could not keep up and the road and
highway system was practically non existent. The exhibit called
"Futurama" introduced life in "the world of tomorrow", a utopia
where automated highways connected cities [32].
• Aviation, Rail, Shipping
Even though the term has been closely linked to automotive trans-
portation, intelligent systems are in use in every mode of transport.
In the rail and shipping sectors, the first applications of wireless com-
munication goes back to the 70s with analogue radio and remote dia-
gnostics. Nowadays information and communications technologies
are an integrated and vital part of the industry and have multiple
purposes [19]:
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Figure 1.1: A figure of ITS applications and interoperability [3]
– Signalling systems
– Vehicle positioning
– Passenger load, schedule estimation, event messages
– Diagnostic systems
– Communication and entertainment systems
– Weather information
Such systems are even more prevalent and important in aviation.
Collision avoidance systems, radio communications and logistic
systems have been in use for decades and are at the core of modern
commercial flights.
1.1.2 Motivation
The motivation for ITS lies in their several potential benefits:
• Increased efficiency
• Greater commuting speeds
• Accurate and timely status information
• Lower costs
• Increased safety
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• Effective demand-response management
• Environmentally friendly commuting
• Increased comfort and convenience
1.1.3 Current status
Despite great efforts in urban planing roadway infrastructure and highway
systems, road transport is constantly a source of frustration owing to
several problems like unpredictable drivers, accidents and low capacity
that ultimately lead to inefficiency in both time and material resources. The
most obvious consequence of such problems is congestion in automotive
networks. Congestion has been a major issue for a very long time and its
severity keeps escalating thanks to the rapidly growing number of vehicles
on the roads. Average vehicular speeds have in some cases remained
unchanged from 100 years ago when horse-drawn carriages were used [9].
At this time, a review of the related literature indicates a keen interest
in several applications and areas of research including system planning,
vehicular traffic modelling, vehicle tracking, autonomous driving and GPS-
based guidance, signal control, smart braking, lane detection and steering
control, intelligent cruise control, disseminating of critical information to
drivers, cooperative driving, entertainment and more.
Despite this interest only few applications of ITS can be seen in every-
day use, mostly automatic toll collection, traffic monitoring and simple in-
formatory systems (variable message signs, radio announcements). These
are easy to introduce, non-intrusive applications with little or no require-
ments on the vehicle driver’s part but their effect on commuting efficiency
is correspondingly small.
Larger projects have been held back because of unwillingness to commit
to the seemingly immense research and development required. At this
point however, ITS seems to be the next logical step:
• The use of electronics and telecommunications has become extremely
commonplace and vehicles have integrated increasingly more elec-
tronic safety and information systems.
• The cost and complexity of development and deployment of new
technologies and services has been radically reduced.
• Experience and research have addressed many of the concerns for
reliability and safety.
1.1.4 Communication Requirements
Many different communication standards have been proposed for ITS
ranging from optical Line-Of-Site (LOS), short range solutions to long
range radio communication. The diversity of applications in the field
dictates no one solution to fit every scenario. Some of the prominent
communication protocols are described in section 1.4.
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1.2 Platooning
1.2.1 Overview
Platooning is the grouping of individuals in a way to provide benefits to
the group depending on the application.
• In nature
Animals have been observed to travel in formations. In [2], lobsters
travelling in a queue reduced their hydrodynamic drag to roughly
half of what is sustained by an individual. More research has focused
on migratory birds [20], [13] which have been found to travel up
to 70% further when travelling in formation owing to reduction of
drag by 45% compared to a single bird. Birds gain additional lift by
flying in the up-wash of the ones ahead of them. A second benefit
of flying in formation is that communication between the members is
preserved as visual contact can be maintained easily.
• In aviation
Formation flying was developed during World War I [6] and quickly
became standard practice for fighter aircraft. Similarly to bird
formations, this provides better communication and visibility as well
as concentration of fire-power. The benefit of reduced drag applies
here too but has not been exploited yet in commercial flights due
to inadequate research and concerns about safety, however recently
there has been renewed interest and extensive research on the subject
[23].
• In automotive
Similar benefits apply to road going vehicles. This is especially seen
in competitive sports, from bicycle racing to automotive racing. This
technique known as drafting allows significant energy savings and
higher performance by reducing atmospheric drag.
1.2.2 Motivation
In automotive applications, grouping vehicles into platoons provides a way
to increase the capacity of roadway systems while improving efficiency and
safety. Platoons exchange information between their members to safely
decrease the headway between the vehicles and allow them to move as a
single unit. Such a system could be completely autonomous, eliminating
the constant need for human interaction. This capability would offer
multiple additional benefits including:
• Reduction of the atmospheric drag leading to significantly improved
fuel consumption
• Instantaneous reaction times leading to improved safety
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• Dampening of acceleration forces leading to reduced vehicle wear
and improved comfort for the passengers
• Unattended driving
1.2.3 Current status
A variety of scenarios have been considered for the concept of platooning.
Initially, these included significant amounts of modifications to the road
infrastructure and vehicles and possibly significant changes in driving
procedures such as scheduling of the trip beforehand to coincide with an
available platoon or using separate driving lanes and routes. Subsequently,
with cheaper electronics and integration of electronic systems into vehicles
by the manufacturers efforts moved to more natural solutions where no
modifications are required to the road infrastructure and platoons follow
a specialized lead vehicle driven by a professional driver [33]. Eventually,
systems based solely on equipment that will come standard in commercial
vehicles can be envisioned, however due to the complexity and safety
critical nature of such a system there are still significant challenges to be
solved, for example interactions with conventional traffic on public roads.
Acceptability is also an important issue that has yet to be solved.
At this point, important steps have already been taken towards this
direction with the introduction of several driving assistance systems into
new vehicles by the manufacturers:
• In-vehicle navigation systems provide autonomous geo-spatial pos-
itioning and guidance.
• Adaptive Cruise Control monitors the area around a vehicle and
adjusts its speed to maintain a safe distance from other vehicles.
Control is imposed based on sensor information from on-board
sensors only.
• Intelligent speed adaptation adjusts the vehicle’s speed to the local
speed limit (through map information or sign recognition).
• Traffic sign recognition recognizes the traffic signs put on the road
(speed limits, stop signs, dangerous turns ahead etc.) and warns the
driver.
• Lane departure warning warns a driver when the vehicle begins to
move out of its lane unintentionally.
• Blind spot detection detects vehicles located in areas where view can
be obstructed by the design of the vehicle or human anatomy.
• Collision avoidance systems use on-board sensors to detect an
imminent crash and prevent it or at least reduce its severity and
protect the occupants of the vehicle.
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1.2.4 Communication Requirements
The principals of operation of platooning dictate the need for an extremely
reliable, short to medium range solution of adequate performance. Despite
efforts of standardization, there is still considerable debate around this sub-
ject and many novel solutions attempting to combine different protocols to
offer the best combination of reliability and performance.
1.3 Networking Paradigms
1.3.1 Mobile Ad hoc Networks
A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a type of self-organizing network
that combines wireless communication with a high-degree node mobility.
Unlike conventional networks, they have no fixed infrastructure (base
stations, centralized management points etc.). This makes them attractive
for many flexible applications where the network topology may change
rapidly or the fixed infrastructure may be infeasible or non-operational.
Conventional networks use dedicated nodes to carry out basic functions
such as packet forwarding, routing, and network management. In ad
hoc networks, these are carried out collaboratively by all nodes available.
Nodes on MANETs use multi-hop communication: nodes that are within
each other’s radio range can communicate directly through wireless links,
whereas those that are far apart must rely on intermediate nodes to act
as routers to relay messages. Mobile nodes can move, leave, and join the
network, and routes need to be updated frequently due to the dynamic
network topology.
1.3.2 Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
VANETs are a special form of MANETs formed by the use of short-range
radios installed in private and public vehicles. The first requirement
of VANETs is to have each vehicle equipped with some form of short-
range communication facility. Other optional components of a VANET
node include those for providing detailed position information, road-
side infrastructure units (RSUs), and central authorities responsible for
identity management and registration. Communication in these networks
involves both Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)
communications. Vehicles communicate with one another when they
are within their transmission ranges. Vehicles will also communicate
with road-side infrastructure, if and when it is present. The road-
side infrastructure will be spread regularly or sporadically depending
on the region and extent of deployment. Vehicular Networks have
several unique characteristics that significantly affect the development of
hardware, software and communication protocols targeted at this field.
Examples are:
• Rapid topology changes
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• Frequent fragmentation
• High mobility
• Dynamic scale and density
• Real-time requirements
• Location awareness requirements
• Incentive based participation
• Relaxed power constraints (compared to usual MANET applications)
• High privacy requirements (affecting authentication paradigms)
• Failure criticality (critical infrastructures)
• No security separation (completely open and distributed system)
• Vulnerability to physical attacks
These present additional challenges and opportunities when consider-
ing issues such as communication protocols and security.
1.4 Communication Protocols
Focusing on VANET applications, there have been several communication
protocols proposed.
IEEE 802.11 and DSRC
This is the most prominent protocol in wireless communication and
is therefore mentioned here in greater detail. Dedicated Short-Range
Communications (DSRC) is based on IEEE 802.11 technology and proceeds
toward standardization under the name of IEEE 802.11p. DSRC is attractive
due to the large bandwidth and the possibility of using multiple channels.
More importantly, the 802.11 wireless specifications have been extremely
popular and globally used since 1999 (802.11a) and as such have been
under extensive testing and continuous improvements. The IEEE 802.11p
standard, looks at issues related to the highly dynamic environment and
the extremely short time durations, during which communications must
be completed due to the high speed of the communicating vehicles.
DSRC has two modes of operations: Ad hoc mode characterized by
distributed multi-hop networking [Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V)], Infrastructure
mode characterized by a centralized mobile single hop network [Vehicle
to Infrastructure (V2I)]. The IEEE is involved in standards development
related to the physical, medium access and security issues as well as in
defining higher layer services and interfaces for intelligent transport. By
the end of 2006, the IEEE P1609 standards for Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments (WAVE) had specified the application layer and message
formats for operation in the 5.9 GHz DSRC communications. Specifically
[18]:
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• IEEE 802.11p is based on the IEEE 802.11a standard and specifies Me-
dium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications
• IEEE 1609.0 defines services for multi-channel DSRC/WAVE devices
to communicate in a vehicular environment
• IEEE 1609.1 specifies methods for system resource management and
handling of multiple data streams
• IEEE 1609.2 addresses WAVE security
• IEEE 1609.3 defines networking protocols and services
• IEEE 1609.4 specifies channel management and operation
Focusing on the Physical and MAC layer, 802.11p will have to operate
in medium ranges, very high mobility and rapidly changing channel
conditions. To cope with the new requirements, 802.11p introduces two
changes in the PHY layer as defined by 802.11a . While 802.11a specifies
the 5.170-5.230 GHz and 5.735-5.835 GHz bands, 802.11p operates on a
higher frequency (5.850-5.925 GHz), free of interference from other devices.
Additionally, the channel width is halved to 10 Mhz compared to 20 Mhz
for 802.11a. It is stated that "this has a number of cascading side effects,
some of which aid in compensating for vehicular wireless channels" [12].
Multiplexing techniques are used in most means of telecommunication
to allow multiple signals to be combined into a single one and enable shar-
ing of the transmission medium. There are several types of multiplexing in-
cluding space-division multiplexing (SDM), frequency-division multiplex-
ing (FDM), time-division multiplexing (TDM) and code division multiplex-
ing (CDM).
Like its predecessor, 802.11p uses Orthogonal Frequency-Division
Multiplexing (OFDM) which is a FDM scheme for encoding data on
multiple carrier frequencies. In this scheme, the carrier signals are
orthogonal to each other. This means that an ideal receiver can easily and
completely reject unwanted signals. OFDM compensates for both time and
frequency-selective fading and performs well with the dispersive linear
channels found in mobile environments [12]. In 802.11p optional, enhanced
performance specifications have been provided for both adjacent and non-
adjacent channel rejection [1].
There are several other candidates for Vehicular Networking that can be
used individually or are envisioned to complement each other depending
on the application:
• Cellular Networks
Cellular systems have been evolving rapidly to support the ever
increasing demands of mobile networking. 2G systems support data
communications at the maximum rate of 9.6kbps. Technologies such
as GPRS and EDGE provide higher rate communications. Now 3G
systems support much higher data rate and 4G systems will soon be
deployed based on all-IP network infrastructure.
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• WiMAX
802.16e or WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Ac-
cess) aims at enabling the delivery of last mile wireless broadband
access as an alternative to cable and xDSL, thus providing wireless
data over long distances. This will fill the gap between 3G and WLAN
standards, providing the data rate, mobility and coverage required to
deliver the Internet access to mobile clients.
• Bluetooth
New versions of the bluetooth standard, popular with mobile devices
have been proposed for use in VANETs [7] as a good trade-off
between energy requirements, communication range and flexibility.
• CALM
One of the technical committees in the ISO group (ISO/TC 204 Intel-
ligent transport systems) is tasked with "standardization of inform-
ation, communication and control systems in the field of urban and
rural surface transportation" and is responsible for the overall sys-
tem aspects and infrastructure aspects of ITS [15]. It has produced
a framework and set of standards known as Communication Archi-
tecture for Land Mobile (CALM). It was designed to support the full
spectrum of ITS applications, in a flexible manner. It abstracts the
communication protocols from the applications, based on two basic
premises:
– Different countries use different choices and frequencies for ITS
media.
– Different ITS applications have different requirements.
Therefore, many different technologies are supported, including:
– CALM 2G/3G mobile networks to support long distance com-
munication
– CALM IR and MMWAVE operating at 60GHz to support short
and medium-range directed communication
– CALM M5 operating in the frequency range of 5–6 GHz is used
for short and medium-range omni-directional communication
(derived from DSRC/WAVE)
Other media such as Bluetooth and WiMAX (IEEE 802.16e) are also
expected to be integrated in future.
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1.5 Security
1.5.1 Overview
VANETs are susceptible to various types of attacks. These differ according
to the situation, attacker’s intent, scope and the amount of damage. Attacks
on wireless networks can be broadly classified into two categories based on
the adversary’s proximity to the network:
• Outsider attacks
The adversary is not a part of the network.
• Insider attacks
The adversary is a member of the network he is attacking. These
attacks can have more severe consequences and be harder to detect
and counter.
Attacks can be further categorized into three main categories based on
the kind of threat they present to the network:
• Threats to availability
To ensure availability, we need mechanisms in place that can detect
and mitigate those attacks that can deny authenticated users access
to the network such as:
– Denial of Service Attacks
– Broadcast Tampering
– Malware
– Spamming
– Black Hole Attacks
• Threats to authenticity
Threats to authenticity include [43]:
– Masquerading
– Replay Attacks
– Global Positioning System (GPS) Spoofing
– Tunnelling
– Position Faking
– Message tampering
– Message Suppression/Fabrication/alteration
– Key and/or certificate replication
– Sybil attack
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Protecting a vehicular network against these attacks involves identi-
fying legitimate nodes and preventing attackers from infiltrating the
network under a false identity, identifying messages that have been
tampered with, fake GPS signals and any sort of misinformation in-
troduced in the network.
• Threats to confidentiality of messages
Owing to the wireless and public nature of a vehicular network, it is
particularly vulnerable to techniques such as eavesdropping of mes-
sages and location information available through the transmission of
broadcast messages. Providing location privacy and anonymity is
important to vehicle users. This involves obscuring the user’s exact
location in space and time and concealing user requests by making
them indistinguishable from other users’ requests.
1.5.2 Security in Ad hoc networks
Due to their special nature, ad hoc networks present additional security
challenges. Many of the problems that have been adequately addressed on
traditional networks require a different approach in this new environment
and completely new vulnerabilities need to be addressed [26].
• Wireless links
The wireless medium opens up new opportunities for attackers.
Physical access to the network is not required for attacks such as
eavesdropping and jamming. In addition, the -typically- lower
bandwidth and higher latency inherent in wireless networks can be
of assistance in disrupting communications.
• Dynamic topology
Nodes in an ad hoc network can move around, join or leave the
network independently. It is therefore difficult to distinguish between
normal behaviour of the network and situations where nodes have
become unavailable due to some anomaly.
• No separation from surrounding
Defining the boundaries of a network and the roles of the nodes in it
is not a trivial task. Multiple different nodes may need to co-exist and
malicious behaviours can be expected in all directions.
• Limited resources
Restrictions in hardware cost and energy consumption lead to limited
options in securing communications and finite battery life provides
adversaries with new attack options.
13
1.6 Jamming
Channel jamming is a type of Denial of Service (DoS) attack aiming to block
access to a communication channel by high power transmission on the
communication channel or by injection of dummy messages [26]. In DoS
attacks, an attacker attempts to prevent legitimate and authorized users
from the services offered by the network. Due to the unique nature of ad
hoc wireless networks, DoS attack can exploit features that are not present
in conventional wired networks.
"Of the three principal tenets of information, relevance, accuracy
and timeliness, jamming is primarily intended to address the last. If
information is successfully exchanged, there is little that jamming can
do to impact directly the relevance and accuracy of that information.
Jamming activities however can impact on the timeliness of the information
exchange. Jamming can also affect the relevance of information because if
it arrives at the intended destination too late to be of use, the information
has become irrelevant" [31].
There are multiple points of a network that can be targeted by DoS
attacks. On the physical layer, the attacker can employ jamming signals
that overpower other transmissions on the wireless medium. This is a
simple attack where the attacker will usually start by only monitoring the
wireless channels. Once he has determined the frequency at which the
target is communicating, it can transmit on the same frequency to cause
interference and induce errors [22].
Since the network coverage area (e.g. along a highway) can be
well-defined at least locally, jamming is a low-effort exploit opportunity:
an attacker can relatively easily without compromising cryptographic
mechanisms and with limited transmission power, partition the vehicular
network. Identifying the presence of an unintentional disruption is the first
step in minimizing the impact. Jamming can be detected at the physical
layer of the network. In the simplest forms of attacks, the increased
background noise results in a faltered noise-to-signal ratio, which can be
measured at the client. From there, there are a couple of techniques that
can be used to reconfigure the channel and avoid the attack which will
be mentioned in section 1.7. However, it is not always simple to detect
an attack and selecting a different channel does not always eliminate the
threat.
Jamming attacks can be classified based on the transmitting strategy
followed by the jammer:
• Constant jammer
Continually emits a strong radio signal.
• Random jammer
Instead of continuously sending out a radio signal, alternates
between sleeping and jamming.
14
• Reactive jammer
Stays quiet when the channel is idle, but starts transmitting a radio
signal as soon as it senses activity on the channel.
• Deceptive jammer
Instead of sending out random bits, constantly injects regular
packets to the channel without any gap between subsequent packet
transmissions.
1.7 Defences
Jamming occurs on the physical layer and thus, given enough resources
all RF systems can be jammed. "Being totally free from the effects of RF
jamming in a wireless communication environment is an unrealistic goal"
[31].
Nonetheless, different techniques for Anti-Jamming have been de-
veloped. These are commonly based on hiding the signals so they are
hard to detect and thus jam, alternating between multiple frequencies of
the spectrum to prevent narrowband receivers from intercepting the signal
or to have redundancy coding of digital signals.
More anti-jamming techniques include:
High layer techniques
• Channel surfing is a link layer technique, alternating the communic-
ation frequency on demand. It is in some ways similar to frequency
hopping which will be explained in the physical layer section [40].
• Spatial Retreats is a technique not applicable to platooning applica-
tions where nodes try to evacuate from the jammed regions.
• Multipath routing and routing around a jammed area can be effective
in partially jammed networks with many nodes.
Physical layer techniques
Considering jamming attacks, the physical layer (PHY) will be the first
and most important part of the communications stack to consider, followed
by the Media Access Control sub-layer (MAC).
The PHY layer consists of the basic networking hardware transmission
technologies of the network. It is the layer where radio interfaces
(frequencies, signal strength, bandwidth) are established and techniques
like modulation, multiplexing and carrier sense are applied. Parameters of
this layer will affect how sensitive a wireless link is to physical attacks and
should be well understood when considering jamming.
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In military terminology there are systems that can be classified as Low
Probability of Detection (LPD) or Low Probability of Interception (LPI). In
LPD systems the goal is to hide the signal in a way that an unintended
receiver has difficulty determining that the signal is even present. There
are many potential reasons for doing so. In a military setting it might be
desirable to be able to communicate in a particular area without anyone
knowing the presence of the nodes. Spread Spectrum (SS) is an example
of a LPD technology. If a signal cannot achieve LPD then by definition an
unintended receiver can detect the presence of the signal. It is still possible
to provide some protection of signals however. They can be made to be
difficult to intercept and in such cases the signals are referred to as LPI.
Frequency-hopping described later is an example of a LPI technology.
An alternative to performing evasion strategies, where the sensor nodes
try to evade the jammer in some sense, is to have the sensors attempt
to compete against the jammer. In this case the objective should be for
the sensors to improve the reliability of the reception of their packets.
Another prospect is based on the fact that vehicles can have several wireless
technologies on-board. To thwart DoS attacks, communication can be
seamlessly switched between primary and backup channels. This could
be achieved by a protocol like CALM (see section 1.4).
• Spread Spectrum
Spread Spectrum communications technology was patented by Nic-
ola Tesla as early as 1903 and later on developed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defence as a way to thwart transmission detection, exploit-
ation, and countermeasures by adversaries. These communication
technologies are rapidly moving out of the strictly military domain
into commercial applications. One of these is the code division mul-
tiple access (CDMA) spread spectrum (SS). Another example uses
frequency hopping to achieve frequency diversity. SS communic-
ation technology was developed as a communication technique to
provide some degree of electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM)
for the communicator (given that jamming is an ECM technique). It
represents one of the LPI and Low Probability of Exploitation (LPE)
techniques. A traditional single-tone jammer has little effect on the
performance of such systems, forcing the jammer to adopt different
schemes of attack. At the very least, a jammer must be concerned
about a much broader frequency range. One of the advantages of
DSSS technologies is the ability to reuse the frequency spectrum. This
is true for commercial wireless communications as well. Such com-
munications overlay one another in the frequency domain and allow
many users to share the same frequencies. CDMA is facilitated by
each user having a different code to spread its waveform.
16
– Frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS)
FHSS is a method of transmitting radio signals by rapidly
switching a carrier among many frequency channels, using
a pseudo-random sequence known to both transmitter and
receiver.
– Direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS)
DSSS is a modulation technique. The transmitted signal takes
up the full bandwidth (spectrum) of a device’s transmitting
frequency.
• Modulation
Modulation is the process of converting a message signal (for
example a binary bit stream or an analogue audio signal) and adding
its information in another signal that can be physically transmitted
(electronic, optical, radio-signal).
• Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing, or OFDM , is not a
SS technology but is sometimes referred to as SS because of its
similar resilience against interference. A special implementation of
OFDM is used in IEEE 802.11g, and it has been widely implemented
in IEEE 802.11a technology as well. OFDM offers high data
rates and exceptional resistance to interference and corruption.
OFDM is a digital modulation method that splits the signal into
multiple narrowband sub-carriers at different frequencies. Due to the
interference problems encountered if the single high speed or high
bandwidth signal were transmitted, the use of multiple lower speed
or lower bandwidth sub-carriers actually results in higher data rates.
OFDM can be combined with other forms of space diversity such as
antenna arrays and MIMO channels.
• Polarization
The polarization of an antenna is the orientation of the electric field of
the radio wave with respect to the Earth’s surface and is determined
by the physical structure of the antenna and by its orientation.
• Selectivity
Selectivity is a measure of a receiver’s ability to respond to the
frequency it has been tuned to, rejecting adjacent frequencies or
broadcast signals[12].
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• Multiple Input Multiple Output
Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) is the use of multiple anten-
nas at both the transmitter and receiver to improve communication
performance. It is one of several forms of smart antenna technology.
• Beamforming
Beamforming (or spatial filtering) is a signal processing technique
that can be used when multiple antennas are available. It allows
directivity to be achieved in transmission or reception of signals
without the use of directional antennas. This allows for easy
and rapid reconfiguration. This technique works by combining
the antennas in a way that the interference created between them
dissipates the signal in unwanted directions while amplifying the
signal in the desired direction [8]. Directivity is a measure of the
power density the antenna radiates in the direction of its strongest
emission, compared to the power density radiated by an ideal
isotropic radiator radiating the same total power. Directivity is
often desirable because emissions are intended to go in a particular
direction or at least in a particular plane, with emissions in other
directions or planes being wasteful or hurtful.
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1.8 Simulation
The simulation of VANETs requires the consideration of two very different
aspects of a mobile network [12]:
• Communications simulation
Covered by network simulators that are in wide spread use in the
network research community (e.g. NS-2/NS-3, OPNET, OMNET++
etc.)
• Mobility simulation
Covered by different vehicular mobility modelling approaches
(traffic, flow, random, behavioural, trace, survey)
Because these two simulation environments were not originally de-
signed to interconnect and are controlled separately, the need to develop
communication interfaces between them or workarounds that enable them
to be used in conjunction have been an important area for the VANETs re-
search community.
The approaches used can be classified into three categories [12]:
• Isolated mobility models
Mobility scenarios are generated by mobility modelling and then
loaded into a network simulator. No interaction is possible between
the simulator and the pre-generated scenario. This approach was
until recently a favourite since it allowed the use of state of the
art mobility modelling and network simulation while there was no
requirement for interaction between the two environments.
• Embedded Mobility models
Newly developed network simulators with embedded mobility
modelling. This approach provides native collaboration between
the two environments. Current solutions in this category provide a
compromise between the comprehensive capabilities of established
simulation environments and their inability to interface with mobility
models.
• Federated mobility models
Active interfacing of established network simulators with mobility
models. This approach provides both state of the art mobility
modelling and network simulation as well as interaction between
the two environments. However, the development of an interface
and configuration may not be an easy task. Additionally, it is
computationally intensive as both environments need to be run
synchronously.
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Chapter 2
Objectives and Scope
Seeing as platooning applications rely on continuous communication
between the member nodes to provide the intended functionality and
safety, it is of paramount importance that disruptions of the connectivity
between vehicles can be immediately discovered and addressed. As the
typical platooning system would largely operate autonomously in small
ranges and disconnected from a wider network (as the internet), attacks
that can be launched at close proximity with minimal infrastructure or pre-
vious knowledge of the system are especially attractive to potential ad-
versaries. Jamming attacks that target the lower layers of communication
have these properties that could make them attractive to attackers.
The objective of this master thesis is to:
• Understand the threats that can be presented to VANETs, focusing on
the application of vehicle platooning and explore the state of the art in
preventing and detecting DoS attacks, focusing on communications
jamming.
• Examine the opportunities presented by the special characteristics of
VANET to mitigate the effects of an attack.
• Develop a simulation environment capable of modelling the phys-
ical operation of a platoon as well as the networking and communic-
ation requirements of such an application.
• Implement attacks and test defence methods for ensuring minimum
operation and full safety can be preserved in case of an attack.
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Chapter 3
Related Research
Security of wireless communications is a vast and complicated field, subject
to continuous research. It encompasses many different technologies and
applications. As such, there is a huge amount of literature ranging from
almost philosophical standpoints down to the definition of small details of
very specific scenarios.
As most of the protocols developed for use with VANETs are based on
existing and widely used wireless protocols, security on the higher layers of
the network stack has largely been addressed. However the physical layer
is significantly different in VANETs and needs to be examined as such.
Because of the use of Carrier Sense (CS) for Medium Access Control
(MAC) used in these protocols, they are "susceptible to simple and
severe jamming problems: an adversary can disregard the medium access
control and continually transmit on a wireless channel. In that way, he
either prevents users from being able to commence with legitimate MAC
operations or introduces packet collisions that force repeated backoffs or
even jams transmissions" [41].
Jamming has been extensively studied, owing mostly to its significance
in military applications of electronic warfare and stealth (see section
1.7). In commercial use however, techniques used by the military
may not be feasible due to the different communication requirements
or laws restricting wireless communications etiquette and hardware.
Additionally, jamming resistance is not always important in commercial
applications as potential attacks do not benefit from blocking signals but
rather by intercepting and modifying data packets. In safety critical
applications however like the platoon scenario and other ITS applications
simply preventing some data from reaching their destination in a timely
manner can result in severe consequences for the correct operation of the
application and even worse, endangerment of human life.
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3.1 Jamming
There has been extensive research in the subject of jamming but not many
papers have addressed this issue in applications of VANETs.
In [34], the effects of jamming are examined on 802.11p based Vehicle-
to-Vehicle communications. Different jamming patterns are described
and their effectiveness is characterized in an anechoic chamber followed
by measurements in outdoor scenarios. This work demonstrated that
a Radio-Frequency jammer can "severely impact VANET communication
and the supported applications". They point out improvements that could
be made on the 802.11p protocol to increase resilience to jamming and
briefly examine a software driven method for controlling radio sensitivity
(Ambient Noise Immunity).
In [10], the authors address the effects that a wireless jammer can have
on the stability and performance of vehicles in a platoon, using a specific
control algorithm [21]. Using the UIUC VANET simulator [11] and the
platooning controller proposed in [21], they demonstrated that successful
jamming can cause vehicle collisions and proposed a simple solution of an
estimator to avoid collisions in scenarios of constant velocity.
Pelechrinis et al. has published several papers related to jamming and
focusing on 802.11 networks.
In [28], the effectiveness of Frequency Hoping is analysed and the prob-
lem of multiple jammers and energy spill between adjacent channels is ex-
amined. It is demonstrated that hoping can be "largely inadequate in cop-
ing with jamming attacks in 802.11 networks". In [29], two physical layer
functions are assessed in their ability to mitigate jamming, rate adaptation
and power control. The authors find that using prominent "rate adapta-
tion algorithms can significantly degrade network performance" and that
"appropriate tuning of the carrier sensing threshold allows a transmitter
to send packets even when being jammed" and can enable the receiver to
capture the original signal. Based on these findings, they build "ARES,
an Anti-jamming Reinforcement System, which tunes the parameters of
rate adaptation and power control to improve the performance in the pres-
ence of jammers". In conclusion, they evaluate ARES in three largely dif-
ferent wireless test-beds to observe an improvement in network through-
put across all scenarios. In [27], a comprehensive overview is presented
of techniques for jamming, jamming detection and jamming prevention.
The writers recognize that every proposed anti-jamming solution "exhibits
limitations and there are more things that need to be done in order for the
problem to be solved satisfactorily".
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3.2 Platooning
Lately there is renewed interest in platooning with major research projects
taking place. However problems with jamming have not received the
attention they deserve. An effort has been made to present literature that is
relevant to platooning, connection quality and requirements.
As far back as 1997, in [36] the authors discuss the impact of multipath
fading and interference to vehicle-to-vehicle communications. They
compare the reliability of radio links based on Time Division Multiple
Access (TDMA), Direct-Sequence Code Division Multiple Access (DS-
CDMA) and Frequency-Hopping with TDMA. Their analysis showed a
large probability of packet loss due to ground-reflected waves. They
investigated using vertical polarization to mitigate the effect and suggested
that antenna diversity could also be used to increase performance. They
also found the system to be sensitive to co-channel interference and
suggested that performance could be largely improved if adjacent lanes
used different frequencies.
In [16], the authors examine vehicle-to-vehicle communication based
on IEEE 802.11p in a Non-Line-Of-Site (NLOS) environment. With varying
obstacles and use cases, they observed packet error rate and consecutive
packet loss. They show that a platooning application is not adequately
supported in all of their measurement scenarios. In conclusion they
provide some suggestions into improving the channel reliability, namely
using antenna diversity or Multiple-Input and Multiple-Output (MIMO)
radio.
3.3 String stability
This is another area of research that has looked into car following models,
communication requirements and the consequences of communication
delays is string stability of vehicular systems. String stability is defined
[30], as the "uniform boundedness of all the states of the interconnected
system for all time if the initial states of the interconnected system are
uniformly bounded" [35]. Simply put, in the case of platooning, it means
that spacing errors will not amplify along the platoon.
"String stability properties of AHS longitudinal vehicle controllers" [4]
considers the platoon as a mass-spring-damper system and compares the
string stability properties of a variety of longitudinal vehicle controllers.
In [37], decentralized spacing control of a platoon in the face of
lossy data-links is investigated. It is shown that by estimating lead
vehicle information in the event of communication drop-outs, weak string
stability can be guaranteed. The authors point out that the worst-case
scenario is when alternate vehicles along the platoon experience drop-outs
simultaneously and that moderately reliable links are sufficient for spacing
control as long as they can recover quickly in the event of a failure.
In [25], a Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control system is studied,
regarding string stability under communication constraints. The authors
25
provide "conditions on the uncertain sampling intervals and delays under
which string stability can still be guaranteed".
In [39], the effect of information delay on string stability is analysed and
simulated. They demonstrate that the effect of information delay on control
gains must be considered in controller design. Finally, by comparing three
different information frameworks they stress that the choice of proper
framework is very important for string stability.
In [42] the authors "conduct a feasibility study of delay-critical safety
applications over vehicular ad hoc networks based on the emerging DSRC
standard". Through simulations, error performance of the physical and
MAC layers of DSRC links was measured under various mobility scenarios.
Following that, support for vehicle collision avoidance applications was
tested in order to gauge the level of support the DSRC standard provides
for this type of applications. Their verdict was that latency performance
was satisfactory but throughput needs to be improved especially in cases of
high mobility, possibly by exploiting the multi-channel capability of DSRC.
In [17], the authors study IEEE 802.11p in different vehicle-to-vehicle
scenarios. A performance analysis under different propagation conditions
and modulation schemes is carried out, looking at bit error rate (BER)
and signal to noise ratio (SNR). Inter-Symbol and Inter-Carrier interference
is shown to be efficiently mitigated but frequency-selective fading is a
problem. They propose using a different value of guard interval to improve
BER performance.
In [38], vehicle-to-vehicle communication based on IEEE 802.11p is
considered, regarding interferences and packet collisions that can lead
to the failure of reception of safety-critical information. The authors
propose a new protocol along with a distributed transmit power control
method aimed at providing fairness, prioritization and congestion control
by modifying transmission power.
In [5], a dynamic equalization scheme is proposed, on top of the existing
DSRC technology. This is shown to improve reliability in highly dynamic
time-varying vehicle-to-vehicle channels. Additionally, the authors invest-
igate the dependence of wireless communication performance (in terms of
PER and throughput) on various design parameters like packet length pay-
load size and data rate.
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Part II
The project
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Chapter 4
Timeline
The steps that were performed and led to the completion of this thesis are
as follows:
• Determined the areas of interest: ITS, Smart Grid, Battery Electric
Vehicles.
Surveyed the state of the art in said areas and investigated opportun-
ities for energy efficient transportation systems.
• Focused on communication requirements in vehicular environments
(V2V, V2I, V2G) and considered several subjects with the most
important being:
– Vehicle platooning
– Bottlenecks in the deployment of EVs (range, support infrastruc-
ture)
– Extension of the SG and integration with EVs (EVs as
power storage and demand-response management tool, load-
balancing)
• Based on the initial research, focus was shifted towards communica-
tion issues in a specific ITS scenario utilizing mostly V2V communic-
ations in VANETs (Vehicle Platooning).
Wrote an essay titled "Denial of Service attacks mitigation in vehicle
platooning applications" outlining the general background, object-
ives and approach for the master’s thesis.
• General survey on
– MANET and VANET communications
– Wireless security
• Performed survey and testing of suitable mobility and network
simulators NS-3, NCTuns, EstiNet, iTetris (SUMO & NS-3), VEINS
(SUMO & OMNeT++) and more.
Got familiar with VEINS and built a simple network, suitable for
basic testing.
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• Wrote the first section of the thesis (Background and related research).
• Determined the objectives and scope of the thesis.
• Developed a simulation environment based on MATLAB and Sim-
ulink including:
– Physical vehicle simulation
– Network simulation
– Attack scenarios
– Defence mechanisms
– Post Processing and Display suite
• Validated model:
– Single vehicle operation
– Multiple vehicle (platoon) operation
– Jamming operation
• Implemented and tested attack scenarios:
– Stationary jammer
– Mobile jammer
• Implemented and tested defences
– Beamforming
– Double anchoring
– GPS verification
– On-board sensors verification
• Wrote conclusions and future work.
• Finalized thesis.
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Chapter 5
Model Construction
Given the problem at hand, and following the literature review, it was
decided that the best way to study the issue of platooning and defences
to jamming, would be through simulation. An environment was therefore
constructed that can simulate the platoon, inter-vehicular communications
and jamming and allows the implementation of different defences and
assessment of their effectiveness. This was developed from scratch using
Simulink and MATLAB. Important sub-systems of the environment are
described below.
5.1 Platoon
This is the workspace integrating the individual components including
all the vehicles and the network. For the purposes of the present project
four vehicles were included, a leader and three followers. This number
was selected to allow the examination of dynamic correlations between the
vehicles: with four vehicles, there can be a lead vehicle, two intermediate
vehicles (if the interaction between intermediate vehicles needs to be
examined), and one end vehicle. It is however possible to extend the model
to include more vehicles with ease.
Figure 5.1 shows the platoon model as configured in Simulink. There
are 5 important parts: the vehicles, the network, P3D outputs (Post-
Processing and Display), the jammer and the profile. The vehicles are noted
on the left side in red. They are connected to the network noted in blue (see
section 5.3) and P3D noted in green (see section 5.4). They have inputs from
the network, the jammer (interferer) noted in brown (see section 7) and the
global configuration module (profile).
Global configuration
As functions were being added to the vehicles, there was a need to
easily control the profile of simulations from a single point. Therefore, a
profile module was added to the platoon model (see figure 5.2). It contains
separate global controls for the vehicles’ R/T (Receive/Transmit) and ECU
(Engine Control Unit) modules in the form of binary octets, converted
from integers (255 means all systems are enabled, 0 means all systems are
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Figure 5.1: Platoon model
disabled). The global controls can be deactivated and each vehicle is then
setup through separate controls in its own profile module located in the
vehicle subsystem (see figure 5.4).
Figure 5.2: Global profile
5.2 Vehicle
The Vehicle sub-system (see figure 5.3) simulates the operation of a single
vehicle within the platoon. It uses data from its sensors and the network
to simulate how the vehicle responds, returning data to the network and
P3D. There are two important modules in the vehicle marked in red: the
Engine Control Unit (ECU) and the Receive/Transmit module (R/T). In
addition, there are several auxiliary modules marked in orange: the profile,
the sensors, the ECU buffer and the R/T buffer. Finally there are several
inputs from the platoon workspace and outputs to the platoon and P3D.
32
Figure 5.3: Vehicle model
ECU
The Engine Control Unit processes the inputs to determine the state of
the vehicle and outputs data to the network and the platoon simulator via
the R/T module. Since we do not have actual sensors, the ECU also has the
task of determining the state of the vehicle in the next step and translating
it to readings that are then fed to the sensors.
The key parameter here is the acceleration of the vehicle. This can be
defined by the user for the lead vehicle and determined by the ECU for
the follower vehicles, based on readings from the network and the vehicle
sensors. Acceleration is then processed to determine the speed, position
and heading of the vehicle as well as other parameters regarding its relation
to other vehicles and the network state.
The full list of ECU inputs, outputs and parameters is shown in tables
5.1 and 5.2. Many functions were added to the ECU through the course of
development that are referred to later in the text (see section 8) as they are
related to defence mechanisms implemented and are not strictly relevant
to the basic functions of the vehicle.
Sensors
This module simulates the sensors of a vehicle, monitoring its acceler-
ation, speed, coordinates and heading. They receive their values from the
ECU and feed them back to the ECU on the next time step.
ECU Buffer
The ECU buffer allows a vehicle to correctly track the path of the
leading vehicle. It delays the response to a change of attitude for the
appropriate time, related to the distance between the vehicles and their
speed.
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Role Defined by Used by Comments
parameters Input User ECU Initial conditions and
constants of the vehicle
settings Input Profile ECU Profile settings
network Input Network ECU Data received from the
network
buffer Input Network+ECU ECU Buffered data received
from the network
sensors Input ECU ECU Data received from the
vehicle sensors
bus Output ECU Network Data sent to the net-
work
delay Output ECU Buffer Buffer delay control
sensorloop Output ECU ECU Data sent to the vehicle
sensors
Table 5.1: ECU Input/Output list
Parameter Description
Acceleration (x and y axis) Defined by the user or calculated by the ECU
Speed (x and y axis) Calculated by the ECU
Heading Calculated by the ECU
Coordinates(x and y axis) Calculated by the ECU
Platoon length Statically defined by the user
Platoon position Statically defined by the user
Table 5.2: ECU parameters
R/T
The Receive/Transmit module handles the connection of the ECU to
the network. This includes calculation of several parameters regarding the
communication beam, the network state and the communicating parties.
The full list of R/T inputs, outputs and parameters is shown in tables
5.3 and 5.4. Ports txin-tx and rx-rxout are the main inputs and outputs,
that contain the data sent to and received from the network. Ports tx and rx
are directly connected to the network, txin and rxout are directly connected
to the ECU. The R/T module processes the data and connects the ECU to
the network. Ports rxbuff and rxbuffout are inputs and outputs to the R/T
buffer.
R/T Buffer
The R/T buffer is used for error correction. It stores the last known
correct values received from the network. It is updated by the R/T module
and used in case of confirmed network errors to maintain the correct
vehicle course and beam settings.
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Role Defined by Used by Comments
parameters Input Profile ECU Initial conditions and
constants of the vehicle
settings Input Profile ECU Profile settings
interferers Input Interferer R/T, ECU Interferers profile
txin Input ECU Network Raw data to be trans-
mitted to the network
rx Input Network R/T Raw data received from
the network
rxbuff Input R/T buffer R/T Buffered data from net-
work
rtout Output R/T Vehicle R/T P3D data
tx Output R/T Network Data transmitted to the
network
rxout Output R/T ECU Processed data re-
ceived from the net-
work
buffswitch Output R/T R/T buffer Buffer switch
rxbuffout Output R/T R/T buffer Network data to be buf-
fered
Table 5.3: R/T module Input/Output list
Parameter Description
Interference Calculated based on network input
2nd party bearing Calculated based network input
Beam direction Calculated based on 2nd party bearing
Beam width Calculated based on 2nd party bearing and network
Table 5.4: R/T parameters
Profile
This module (see figure 5.4) provides the static parameters defined by
the user and is also used for the initialization of the vehicle in the start of
each simulation. It can be controlled separately for each vehicle or through
the global configuration module described in section 5.1.
I/O ports
These include all data transmitted through the network, either by other
vehicles of the platoon or vehicles and stations unrelated to the platoon
(possible interference sources). In addition there are output ports to the
P3D module.
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Figure 5.4: Vehicle profile
5.3 Network
To accurately model the behaviour of a real-life network, communication
complexity was introduced in three levels, each adding to the previous one.
5.3.1 Level 0
Initially, the vehicles were hard-wired to each other by means of a bus
coming from the ECU of each vehicle and multiplexed with the rest into
a superbus. This superbus was then used as the input to each vehicle from
the network. This configuration was used initially for validation of the
simulation of vehicle operation, movement and basic communication.
5.3.2 Level 1
In the first level, the basic parameters of the communication system
were introduced to allow the simulation of beamforming control and
interference. The vehicles were still directly connected with buses.
The R/T module (see figure 5.3) in each vehicle communicates directly
with the vehicle’s ECU (rxout,txin) and the network (rx,tx). This module
handles the transmission and reception of data to and from the network. It
also calculates the desired beam angle and direction based on the vehicle
heading and the distance between the communicating vehicles (see section
8.1 and figures 8.2, 8.3a and 8.3b).
The R/T module in this level provides predetermined values for
wireless signal quality metrics and the network state as no interference
functions have been implemented yet. Along with data received from the
ECU a number of scenarios can be simulated (not an exact representation
but an approximation of the performance).
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In this level the rudimentary functions for calculating beam arc and
direction were formed. Beam direction is calculated based on the relative
position of the communicating vehicles and heading of the transmitting
vehicle (see figure 5.5).
Figure 5.5: Beam direction code
Beam width is calculated based on the distance between the communic-
ating vehicles and the preset width of the beam at the position of the 2nd
party, in this case 5m (see figure 5.6).
Figure 5.6: Beam width code
Initially, the distance calculation from the 2nd party differed to
the real distance measured on P3D. This was because of the delay of
communication between the two vehicles. The base delay for this system is
1 step (0.1 seconds). This can affect measurements significantly, depending
on the vehicle velocity.
The distance measured by each vehicle differs depending on the
position of the 2nd party of the communication in the platoon (preceding
or following). This is due to the fact that a vehicle reads its own position
instantly and the position of the 2nd party with a one-step delay. Example:
Vehicle 1 communicating with vehicle 2 reads its own position instantly
but the position of vehicle 2 with a one-step delay (0.1 s). Vehicle 2
communicating with vehicle 1 has the same delay. Because vehicle 1 is
moving away from vehicle 2 the distance measured by vehicle 1 is larger
than the real distance and accordingly the distance measured by vehicle 2
is smaller than the real distance. This creates a discrepancy in the measured
distance dependent on the speed of the platoon (xd=u*td where td=0.2s(2
steps)).
However, based on the last known location, velocity and acceleration
of the 2nd party, the correct location can be calculated almost precisely (see
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figure 5.7).
Figure 5.7: Sink position approximation code
Based on this data (beam arc, beam direction) and the actual positions of
the vehicles it is now possible to determine if two vehicles can successfully
communicate. In level 1, this was performed in a post-processing script
called beamtest or range finding (see figure 5.8).
Figure 5.8: Beamtest (range finding) script output
The two new variables that are calculated by the R/T module (beam
direction and beam arc) were validated using the more complicated profiles
(MVP6 –MVP7, see section 6.2). The results for communication between the
first two vehicles in MVP6 are shown in table 5.9.
(a) Vehicle 2 to vehicle 1 (b) Vehicle 1 to vehicle 2
Figure 5.9: Beam direction and width validation
5.3.3 Level 2
In this level, a further module (see figure 5.10) was inset between each
sender and receiver, to simulate the effects of the wireless medium. Three
38
different approaches were tested. It is placed on the output of each vehicle
in the platoon. It has a single input and a single output. Data is received
from the transmit bus (tx) of the vehicle’s communication module. The
effects of the channel are calculated and the signal altered accordingly and
then output to an identical bus, to be fed to the input (rx) of a vehicle’s
communication module. This was later improved to integrate information
from the R/T module controlling the amount of interference introduced
(see chapter 7 and figure 5.1).
Figure 5.10: Communication channel (level 1)
Other additions include range finding integrated in the R/T module
and improved by taking into consideration the possible interference.
With the introduction of interference, it was necessary to perform
additional processing of the received data, to ensure that it is logical and
therefore possibly correct. Without this additional processing, even with
the slightest interference, the platoon would break up. This was performed
in the R/T module. A buffer was introduced, to save the latest “correct”
data received and use it as input in case corrupt data were received. In
future levels (not implemented), this would be performed on a parameter-
level, in contrast to frame-level buffering performed in this level.
The communication systems toolbox in MATLAB provides customiz-
able channels to simulate noise and errors in the transmission. For this
purpose, two new functions were introduced to convert the bus signals to
binary arrays, suitable for transmission and then back to a bus signal on
the other end. The placement of the communication channel in the platoon
model is shown in figure 5.10.
Packet-Drop Channel
In the packet-drop channel, it is assumed that certain packets are lost
in transmission or are received containing irrecoverable errors and are
thus discarded. In such a case, a vehicle will only have the last correct
data received available. Figure 5.11 shows the packet drop channel and
figure 5.15 shows the headway attained by the vehicles under interference
causing a 10% packet drop probability and the attitude of the beam
throughout the simulation.
Figure 5.11: Packet Drop channel
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Binary Symmetric Channel
In a binary symmetric channel, there is a small possibility that
transmitted bits are flipped, resulting in incorrect data. Figure 5.12 shows
the packet drop channel and figure 5.14 shows the headway attained by the
vehicles under interference causing a 0.00001 bit error probability and the
attitude of the beam throughout the simulation.
Figure 5.12: Binary Symmetric channel
Additive White Gaussian Noise Channel
The additive white Gaussian noise channel adds uniform, wideband
noise to the signal in a normal time distribution. Noise level is defined
as Signal-to-Noise Ratio. Figure 5.13 shows the packet drop channel and
figure 5.16 shows the headway attained by the vehicles under interference
causing a SnR of 9dB and the attitude of the beam throughout the
simulation.
Figure 5.13: Additive White Gaussian Noise channel
In the end the AWGN channel was selected for this project as it
provided the best approximation of interference. In order for the AWGN
module to be used, it is necessary for the binary signal to undergo
modulation. For this purpose, a Binary Phase Shift Key (BPSK) modulation
scheme was used.
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(a) Vehicles headway (b) Beam attitude
Figure 5.14: Headway and beam with BS channel (0.00001 bit error
probability)
(a) Vehicles headway (b) Beam attitude
Figure 5.15: Headway and beam with PD channel (10% drop probability)
(a) Vehicles headway (b) Beam attitude
Figure 5.16: Headway and beam with AWGN channel (9dB SnR)
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5.4 Platoon Post Processing and Display (P3D)
P3D stands for Platoon Post-Processing and Display. It was constructed
specifically for this environment as a suite of MATLAB scripts used to
post process the results of the whole platoon simulation and display the
routes of individual vehicles, the spatial relations between the vehicles and
more. It takes data from the vehicles and network and plots appropriate
diagrams. Figure 5.17 shows the flowchart of P3D operation.
Figure 5.17: P3D flowchart
This graphical presentation was necessary to visualize the simulation
and easily track important events in each runs’ time-line. Each scenario
may have different data of interest and P3D can be easily reconfigured
accordingly to plot the needed diagrams. The flowchart of P3D in figure
shows the basic sources of data and common graphical outputs.
5.4.1 Graphical output
Initially, only spatial data was plotted, to aid in the configuration and
validation of the vehicle routes. More functions were added gradually,
to include plotting of acceleration, speed, heading, beamforming data as
well as to indicate periods of loss of communication. When interference
was added, the need was presented to look at actual data coming from
the vehicles’ sensors as well as possibly erroneous data, transmitted by the
vehicles’ R/T modules to the network. This data was sent to the MATLAB
workspace separately and P3D was separated into two scripts to process
them: P3Dnet and P3Dsensor.
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As the scripts became more and more complicated, they were separated
into smaller parts handling analysis of each vehicle’s data separately.
Another script was used to calculate and cancel out errors owing to the
design of the simulator. With the introduction of defence mechanisms,
more scripts were used to handle the warnings generated when a
mechanism was triggered. By the end of development, P3D was split up
into 14 scripts. Five of those handled real data gathered from sensors.
Five handled perceived data gathered from the network. Four handled
warnings and one was used to cancel out simulator errors.
The P3D suite was used extensively with the simulator and the
graphical presentations generated are an integral part to understanding the
results of each run. All the graphs presented in this project are directly
generated through P3D.
5.4.2 Animation
In addition to static plots of data gathered during the simulation, an
animation function was desirable to provide a clearer understanding of the
performance of the platoon under the different scenarios. An animation
script was constructed that generates animations that combine data about
the movement of the vehicles, the interference and the beamforming of
senders and receivers. Figure 5.18 shows a screen-shot from an early
version of the animation script. The four vehicles are shown in the process
of turning and the communication beam of vehicle 2 is shown, tracking the
lead vehicle.
Figure 5.18: Animation script screen-shot
Further screen-shots of the animations are examined in later chapters
with the vehicles presented as coloured points, the interferer as a black
square and the communication beams as cones stemming from the vehicles.
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Chapter 6
Model Validation
As with model construction, the model validation employed a staggered
approach whereby successive scenarios of increasing complexity were used
to evaluate the performance of the individual routines and validate the
operation of the complete model.
6.1 Single Vehicle Operation
Initially the platoon was tested in single vehicle mode to validate the
operation of the vehicle sub-routine, its communication with the other
modules and to optimize the ergonomics and operation of the P3D
script. The correctness of the physical calculations performed by the P3D
script was verified against hand calculations based on known simulation
parameters.
The validation also served as an opportunity to experiment with, and
define the acceleration/movement profiles that would be used in the
subsequent full platoon tests. The profiles here are experimental profiles
used during the validation of the model and are designated by the format
SVP# (Single-vehicle Validation Profile #).
6.1.1 Linear profiles
At first, three linear profiles were ran. These were used to validate the
unit conversion (m/s to km/h) and total distance travelled calculations
contained in the vehicle and platoon and to tune the ergonomics and
information contained in the output display generated by P3D.
During the third profile run, extra functionality was added to calculate
the average speed of the vehicle. This was used to compare against
coordinate logs to verify the correct execution of the calculations.
On completing a few runs with these profiles, the correct execution of
the simulator was assured and P3D was fine-tuned to present relative data
in an easy to manage and understandable way.
The route and acceleration-speed parameters of the profiles are shown
in figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.
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Figure 6.1: SVP1
Steady velocity 85 km/h
Figure 6.2: SVP2
Acceleration from 65 km/h (18m/s) to 90 km /h (25m/s)
Figure 6.3: SVP3
Multiple accelerations / decelerations from 65 km/h (18m/s) to 90 km/h (25m/s) to 47
km/h (13m/s) to 72 km/h (20m/s)
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6.1.2 Curve profiles
Following the initial tests, more complicated profiles were created to test
turning, and acceleration. Profile 4 tested the execution of a simple ninety
degree turn. Profile 5 added a second turn in the opposite direction.
Profile 6 added accelerations and decelerations and turning with increased
velocity. Profile 7 was used to test how the simulator and P3D handle
movement in every possible direction.
The profiles’ route and acceleration-speed parameters are shown in
figures 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7.
Figure 6.4: SVP4
Right turn (90) with steady velocity (65 km/h) completed within 20 seconds (0.1g)
Figure 6.5: SVP5
Successive turns with steady velocity (65 km/h) (0.1g)
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Figure 6.6: SVP6
Successive turns with starting velocity of 65km/h, acceleration to 90km/h, deceleration
back to 65 km/h before right turn (0.1g), acceleration to 90km/h and left turn (0.2g)
Figure 6.7: SVP7
180 degree turn with starting velocity of 65km/h acceleration to 90km/h and turn with
steady velocity (0.2g)
6.2 Multiple Vehicle (Platoon) Operation
Initially, each vehicle instantly matched the acceleration of the preceding
vehicle after reading it directly through the MATLAB bus. The lead vehicle
had predetermined acceleration data for the simulation runtime, defined in
the parameters. This confirmed that the vehicles behaved as expected but
certain changes were necessary to achieve realistic behaviour. Each vehicle
had to introduce a delay, corresponding to the vehicle’s speed and distance
from the one ahead (see figure 6.8).
Figure 6.8: Buffer delay code
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All simulation runs beyond validation, have used profile 6.
6.2.1 Following test
The objective here was to see if the followers follow the leader throughout
the profiles tested in single-vehicle validation and test if P3D can post-
process the results
The profiles were again tested, this time for 4 vehicles. P3D was
enhanced to track the headway between each vehicle. It was confirmed
that the vehicles tracked each other as expected in every scenario. Small
errors (deviations) are present due to known limitations with the setup but
can easily be identified and ignored. A script was created for this reason
(see section 5.4).
The profiles here are experimental profiles used during the validation
of the model and are designated by the format MVP# (Multi-vehicle
Validation Profile #).
All the profiles presented in 6.1 were tested for multiple vehicles.
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the route and acceleration-speed parameters for
profiles 3 and 6. These were chosen as the most representative for a linear
and a curve profile. A third plot has now been added, representing the
separation between the vehicles. The x and y axes have also been switched
in the route diagram to make it clearer.
Figure 6.9: MVP3
Multiple accelerations / decelerations from 65 km/h (18m/s) to 90 km/h (25m/s) to 47
km/h (13m/s) to 72 km/h (20m/s)
49
Figure 6.10: MVP6
Successive turns with starting velocity of 65km/h, acceleration to 90km/h, deceleration
back to 65 km/h before right turn (0.1g), acceleration to 90km/h and left turn (0.2g)
6.2.2 Platoon break-up tests
The objective here was to artificially break-up the platoon, verify the
behaviour of the vehicles and test if P3D can detect and record break-ups.
The limits for the platoon to be considered to have broken are shown in
table 6.1.
Parameter Minimum value Maximum value
headway 5 m 20 m
deviation - 5 m
Table 6.1: Platoon breakup limits
An artificial delay was introduced in the link between the 2nd and 3rd
vehicle of the platoon (2nd link), to examine how vehicles would behave
and how P3D would be used to verify the resulting deviations. The 2nd
link was chosen to allow the examination of dynamic correlations between
the vehicles. Corrupting the 2nd link allows the examination of a correct
link between the first two vehicles, a corrupted link between the second
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and third vehicle and a correct link in a section of the platoon that has been
affected by interference.
Two additional profiles were made for this reason (MVP8 and MVP9),
based on profile MVP6.
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 show the route followed by each vehicle and the
separation between the vehicles.
Figure 6.11: MVP8
Artificial delay of (pv5+addelay=10+randi(100)) introduced in the link between 2nd and
3rd vehicle. (Based on MVP6)
Figure 6.12: MVP9
Artificial delay of (pv5+addelay=20+randi(200)) introduced in the link between 2nd and
3rd vehicle. (Based on MVP6)
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Chapter 7
Jamming
This section describes the jammer’s implementation in the simulation
environment, its operational modes and its effects on the platoon.
7.1 Implementation
The jammer was initially a simple subsystem. It consisted of a function
to statically configure its parameters and outputs to the vehicles’ receivers
and the P3D module. This was used for the initial tests and configuration
of the network and vehicle interactions and the set up of P3D to include
jamming data.
For further experimentation, and eventually implementation of an
intelligent mobile jammer, this was improved to resemble a normal vehicle
that can either move independently on and around the road, or track a
vehicle in the platoon (see figure 7.1). As such, it has many of the same
basic vehicle functions but also adds the parameter of transmission power,
to configure the intensity of jamming. The inputs and outputs of the
subsystem are listed in table 7.1. The jammer uses an omnidirectional
antenna and can cause interference in a 500 meter radius.
The interferer creates a virtual signal of configurable intensity which is
received by the vehicles’ R/T module. This is in turn combined with the
transmissions from the other vehicles, a Signal-to-Noise Ratio is calculated
and passed as a parameter to the Additive White Gaussian Noise channel
inside the network. The interference suffered by a vehicle is in direct
correlation to its distance to the interferer and the interferer’s jamming
power. The effect is null for distances greater than 500 meters. The SnR
with no interference present is set to 10 and can drop down to 0 when full
jamming is achieved.
The interferer receives its data directly from the platoon’s sensors and
not the network. This is because it can be assumed that a mobile interferer
would be placed on a manually driven vehicle that can track the platoon
visually, regardless of network inconsistencies.
For the first few tests, the network design was not finalized and there
was no simulation of channels or beamforming. This however, did not
prohibit the idea of simulating an imperfect medium. This was introduced
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(a) Jammer (b) Mobile jammer
Figure 7.1: Jammer model
in the form of arbitrary errors of varying frequency, in the data received by
each vehicle. The results, though not representative of a real interference
scenario, served well for demonstrating the concept and fine tuning the
vehicle dynamics and network synchronization.
With the network setup crystallized, and the different channels tested
(see subsection 5.3.3), an interferer was implemented.
Role Defined
by
Used by Comments
network Input Platoon
sensors
ECU Data received from the
platoon sensors
buffer Input Platoon
sensors
+ ECU
ECU Buffered data received
from the platoon
sensors
sensors Input ECU ECU Data received from the
vehicle sensors
intercoox Output ECU Vehicle R/T X coordinate of jammer
intercooy Output ECU Vehicle R/T Y coordinate of jammer
delay Output ECU Buffer Buffer delay control
sensorloop Output ECU ECU Data sent to the jammer
sensors
Table 7.1: Interferer Input/Output list
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7.2 Stationary Jammer
In this section a simple roadside, stationary jammer is considered. This
could either be a source of unintentional interference or a malicious
interferer.
The stationary jammer was placed in different locations along the
platoon’s path and tested with different power settings to observe the
effects on the platoon. Finally, a location representative of multiple
modes of operation (turning, acceleration and deceleration) was selected
to examine further, as it was a particularly critical and communications
intensive period for the system vulnerable to interference. The placement
of the jammer is shown in figure 7.2 relative to the platoon path (there is no
interference because the jammer is deactivated).
Figure 7.2: Stationary jammer location
At first, the jammer was configured to only interfere with the commu-
nication link between the second and third vehicle. This allowed the exam-
ination of one good link, one under attack and one following an attacked
link. The first run had vehicles with no defence mechanisms activated bey-
ond basic error correction and a jammer transmitting at 80% power. The
route seen by the network is shown on figure 7.3a. It is obvious that vehicle
2 sends erroneous data regarding its position, however vehicle 3 and 4 do
not appear to be influenced. This is due to the built in error correction in
each vehicle, that disregards improbable data. As can be seen on figure 7.3b
there is no extreme deviation from the desired route. However, looking at
the headway (figure 7.4a) and deviation (figure 7.4b) data, it is evident that
the platoon has in fact broken up at the 90 second mark, where deviation
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(a) Network (b) Sensors
Figure 7.3: Stationary jammer route plots, no defences, 80% power
(a) Headway (sensors) (b) Vehicle 3 deviation
Figure 7.4: Headway and deviation, no defences, 80% power
exceeds the cut-off point of 5 meters.
An additional run at 100% jamming power gave a much greater
deviation that can now be clearly seen in figure 7.5. Vehicle 1 performs
normally as well as vehicle 2 which is tracking it. Vehicle 3 has deviated
considerably from the desired route and vehicle 4 has tracked it perfectly,
also deviating from the desired route.
These tests proved that the setup of the vehicles, network and jammer
is sufficient to simulate severe interference that will easily cause a platoon
breakup. These results will be used in the following chapters as a
benchmark for defences against interference.
7.3 Mobile Jammer
Taking into account the mobile nature of the platoon, it is reasonable to
assume that a jammer targeting such a system, would be mobile and able
to track the platoon and attack it continuously. In this chapter, additional
runs are analysed, where the jammer acts similarly to a vehicle, tracking
the platoon and causing continuous interference.
The mobile jammer was setup to follow the platoon leader closely (at a
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Figure 7.5: Stationary jammer route plot (sensors), no defences, 100%
power
maximum distance of 10 meters) and change positions randomly. At this
distance, the maximum level of interference is achieved. Combined with
the persistence of the attack this presents a very challenging scenario. This
is needed as it allows the defence mechanisms that will be presented in the
following chapters to be tested to their breaking point.
In this series of runs, a low jamming power setting was sufficient to
cause a breakup. The jammer was again configured to only interfere with
the communication link between the second and third vehicle. Interference
in all links would cause even greater disruptions.
The route of the platoon is shown in figures 7.6a and 7.6b. In both
cases, it is clear that the platoon has broken up by the time it reaches
the first turning point. If the routes post-breakup were to be compared, it
would appear that the low power setting caused more severe interference.
However, examination of other parameters, such as speed, acceleration,
headway and deviation indicates that breakup has occurred earlier in the
case of 100% power. Specifically, figures 7.7a and 7.7b show deviation from
the path for vehicle 3 in both cases. The cut-off point for deviation has been
set to 5 meters, so these figures indicate a breakup at the 45 second mark for
the 100% power case against 90 seconds for the 60% case. Figures 7.8a and
7.8b show headway between the vehicles. The cut-off point for headway
has been set to 20 meters, so these figures indicate that breakup actually
occurred at the 10 second mark for the 100% power case against 25 seconds
for the 60% case.
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(a) 60% power (b) 100% power
Figure 7.6: Mobile jammer route plots (sensors), no defences
(a) 60% power (b) 100% power
Figure 7.7: Mobile jammer deviation plots (vehicle 3), no defences
(a) 60% power (b) 100% power
Figure 7.8: Mobile jammer headway plots (sensors), no defences
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Chapter 8
Defences
This chapter describes the defence mechanisms implemented and tested in
the simulation. These fall into three categories:
• Interference reduction
• Data redundancy
• Warning systems
They have been examined separately and in combination to determine how
effective they are against an attack and provide a solution to:
1. Reduce interference
2. Provide higher interference tolerance
3. Warn the user when possible faults occur
The following four specific methods have been selected:
• Beamforming
This refers to manipulating the receive/transmit beam to achieve
interference reduction.
• Double anchoring
This refers to utilizing input from multiple sources to achieve data
redundancy and identify possible errors.
• GPS verification
This refers to utilizing a vehicle’s GPS module to check the platoon’s
inputs and provide error correction and warnings.
• On-board sensor verification
This refers to utilizing independent safety systems of a vehicle
to verify the platoon’s inputs and provide error correction and
warnings.
These are presented in the following sections.
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8.1 Beamforming
Beamforming is a technique of actively steering the beam of transmission
and reception of a wireless communication system in such a way that
useful signal reception is maximized while interfering signals reception
is diminished. In this section, beamforming is implemented and its
performance against interference in a platoon is compared with a regular
omnidirectional antenna. An improvement to the simple beamforming
called beam sharpening is also implemented and tested.
This technique enables vehicles to actively manipulate their commu-
nication beams based on feedback from the network and platoon state. The
direction and width of the beam can be set to target specific vehicles in a
platoon to reduce external interference and increase the platoon’s survivab-
ility under attack. In the same way, it can also reduce internal interference
between members of the platoon (not implemented).
8.1.1 Implementation
This function is mainly implemented in the R/T module of a vehicle (see
section 5.2).
The flowchart in figure 8.1 outlines the operations taking place. Vehicle
2 is using beamforming in this scenario and is referred to as the first party
of the communication process and vehicle 1 as the second party.
Figure 8.1: Beamforming flowchart
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Based on the state of the first party (determined by the data sent from its
ECU) and the data received from the second party, several calculations are
performed. The predicted position of the second party on the next time-
step is calculated, based on its last known position, speed, acceleration
and heading. The projected distance between the two vehicles is then
calculated.
The absolute beam direction is calculated based on the two vehicles’
positions. The relative beam direction is calculated based on the absolute
beam direction and the heading of the 1st party. The beam arc is calculated
based on the distance between the vehicles and the desired beam width
at the location of the second party. This means that under normal
operation, the beam width is determined only by the distance between
the communicating vehicles. Figure 8.2 demonstrates the concept of beam
direction and beam width. Table 5.4 lists the full list of parameters handled
by the R/T module.
Figure 8.2: Beamforming parameters
If interference is detected, beam sharpening is performed to mitigate its
effects. Beam sharpening is activated when interference exceeds a preset
limit (set in this simulations to 50% jamming power) and it sharpens the
beam progressively until a preset minimum, based on the desired beam
width at the location of the second party (set in this simulations to 2,5m,
50% of the regular beam). In this case beam width is determined both
by the distance between the communicating vehicles and the presence of
interference. This operation is shown in figure 8.3. In figure 8.3a the
platoon is in the process of turning: the beam is rotated to closely follow
adjacent vehicles and reduce possible interference. In 8.3b the platoon is
operating in higher speed: inter-vehicular distances are increased, so beam
angle is reduced to keep constant width on target and decrease chances
of interference. In 8.3c a mobile jammer is moving alongside the platoon:
the jammer positions itself within the main lobe of the beam, making its
interference more effective. In figure 8.3d beam sharpening is applied:
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on detecting the jamming, the beam is sharpened, thus positioning the
jammer outside the main lobe. While the jammer can still interfere, it is
considerably less effective. The beam is not a perfect cone and besides the
main lobe, smaller side-lobes can still pick up interference, for simplicity
the side lobes are not pictured here.
(a) large beam (b) small beam
(c) jammer in beam (d) jammer avoided
Figure 8.3: Beamforming operation
8.1.2 Results
In addition to the figures analysed here, more are available in appendix A
and electronically upon request.
In all the scenarios presented here, the platoon breaks up when in
omnidirectional mode (see tables 8.1 and 8.2). Figure 8.4a shows the case
of an attack on one link at a power setting of 80%. Vehicle 3 has exceeded
the headway limit of 20m and the platoon has broken up. In figure 8.4b the
same attack is performed on all vehicles and the platoon is again broken
up as expected with much greater maximum headway recorded and a
minimum headway of only 0,4m.
When a single communication link is attacked, plain beamforming
is sufficient to defeat an attack with 80% jamming power (figure 8.4c).
However, the defence fails against attacks with higher power or ones that
target multiple links. For example, when all links were attacked with 80%
power (see figure 8.4d) even though headway was maintained bellow 20m,
the vehicles approached dangerously close (below the limit of 5m) during
the second turn and the platoon broke up.
Since plain beamforming performance was unsatisfactory, beam
sharpening was implemented and the attack profiles were tested again.
The results were very encouraging. When a single link was attacked, the
platoon remained stable even under 100% jamming power. Even when all
links were under attack, the platoon did not break up. As seen in figure 8.4e
the minimum headway is maintained well above 5m and the maximum
values are decreased as well. Figure 8.4f demonstrates the most demanding
scenario tested here, with all links under attack at 100% power. Even in this
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case, the platoon does not break up. However, headway between vehicles
1 and 2 is uncomfortably close to the limits by the end of the second turn.
Attack profile Defence profile
Link Jammer Omnidirectional Beamforming BF with sharpening
2 80% 7 3 3
2 100% 7 7 3
all 80% 7 7 3
all 100% 7 7 3
Table 8.1: Beamforming defence results (stationary jammer)
7: defence failed 3: defence successful
Attack profile Defence profile
Link Jammer Omnidirectional Beamforming BF with sharpening
2 80% 7 7 3
2 100% 7 7 3
all 80% 7 7 3
all 100% 7 7 3
Table 8.2: Beamforming defence results (moving jammer)
7: defence failed 3: defence successful
Table 8.2 shows the results of tests using a mobile jammer. Here
the interference persisted throughout the whole simulation. Simple
beamforming was not sufficient to defeat any of the previous attacks. Beam
sharpening however proved very effective and successfully defeated all the
attacks implemented.
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 demonstrate the movement of the platoon and the
beams of the vehicles and the jammer (designated by a black square) when
beam sharpening is activated or deactivated.
In figure 8.5 beam sharpening is deactivated. Comparing it with figure
8.6 the vehicles maintain sharper beams throughout the simulation. This, in
many instances helps keep the jammer outside the beam and significantly
reduce its effect. In addition, the sharper beam allows less interference to
be picked up compared to the useful communication that is always within
the beam. In other instances it may appear that the opposite happens: the
jammer is outside the beam when no beam sharpening is used whereas
inside when beam sharpening is activated. This is only because in the case
of no beam sharpening, the vehicles are misaligned and is in fact a sign of
the platoon being affected by interference. This is more evident comparing
figures 8.5f and 8.6f.
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When beam sharpening is deactivated, the platoon in fact breaks up as
the distance between vehicles 2 and 3 slightly exceeds the limit of 20m.
(a) link 2 80% omnidirectional (b) all links 80% omnidirectional
(c) link 2 80% beamforming (d) all links 80% beamforming
(e) all links 80% BF with sharpening (f) all links 100% BF with sharpening
Figure 8.4: Beamforming headway plots (stationary jammer)
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8.1.3 Conclusion
Beamforming was implemented and tested in several scenarios. In its
simple form, it successfully defended against low power attacks on a single
link but was not sufficient against more advanced or powerful attacks.
An improvement was implemented that allowed the beam to be
sharpened in the presence of high interference, improving the Signal-to-
Noise ratio at the cost of higher risk of misplacing the beam and losing
contact during high speed relative movement of the vehicles.
With beam sharpening the results were promising. The platoon was
able to resist stronger attacks, and be more stable than before. Even the
strongest attack was unsuccessful in breaking the platoon, even though
it tested this defence method to its limits. This was an incentive for
investigating additional defence mechanisms that could be combined with
beamforming.
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(a) t= 10 seconds (b) t= 50 seconds
(c) t= 92.5 seconds (d) t= 95 seconds
(e) t= 100 seconds (f) t= 140 seconds
(g) t= 152.5 seconds (h) t= 170 seconds
Figure 8.5: Platoon animation, beamforming, 80% jamming power
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(a) t= 10 seconds (b) t= 50 seconds
(c) t= 92.5 seconds (d) t= 95 seconds
(e) t= 100 seconds (f) t= 140 seconds
(g) t= 152.5 seconds (h) t= 170 seconds
Figure 8.6: Platoon animation, beamforming with beam sharpening, 80%
jamming power
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8.2 Double Anchoring
Double anchoring refers to a vehicle that receives data from two vehicles
preceding it in the platoon. In this way, data can be checked for
inconsistencies and corrected, in case received data from one of the vehicles
is determined to be erroneous for any reason.
Under normal operation, this would not be necessary. It can be
assumed that if all data is sent and received correctly, only the most
relevant information of the preceding vehicle would be enough to safely
and accurately control a vehicle.
However when there is only one source of data, if an error occurs
the only option would be to operate in a "safe mode". This would
mean that automatic control of the vehicle would be lost, a warning
would be generated and the driver would have to immediately assume
manual control. This would present a very dangerous situation, especially
when vehicles in a platoon would normally operate at a closer proximity
than would be comfortable for human drivers. This can be made safer
by controlled automatic break-up of the platoon, handled by secondary
systems (e.g. Adaptive Cruise Control).
To prevent this, a secondary (redundant) source of data can be used if
possible. When a fault is detected in the primary source, the vehicle can
fall back to the secondary source for a short period until the fault has been
addressed.
8.2.1 Implementation
The double anchoring function is implemented in the ECU of the vehicles.
The flowchart in figure 8.7 outlines the operations taking place. Any
communication in the network is picked up by a vehicle’s R/T module and
passed to the ECU module. The ECU selects the data relevant to its state
(in this example, from vehicles 1 and 2). After discarding any improbable
values, the data from the two vehicles is compared. If the data agrees,
it is assumed to be correct and used to control the vehicle. If the data is
inconsistent, the ECU uses cached data to maintain the vehicle’s course and
logs a warning. If a certain threshold of warnings is reached, it is assumed
that the discrepancies are not due to random errors but there is a problem
that needs to be addressed.
Table 8.3 summarizes the results of the tests conducted with the
double anchoring function enabled. These include the simple omni-
directional approach as well as the combination of the beamforming
defence implemented in section 8.1. With no beamforming defence, the
double anchoring defence can provide some but not complete protection
from jamming. Combining double anchoring with the beamforming
defence, provides additional resistance to jamming. The combined results
are better to either the simple omnidirectional defence or beamforming
defences (compare with table 8.1).
Selected results are discussed in subsection 8.2.2.
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Figure 8.7: Double anchoring flowchart
8.2.2 Results
In addition to the figures analysed here, more are available in appendix A
and electronically upon request.
When a single communication link is attacked, the double anchoring
defence is sufficient to defeat an attack with 80% jamming power (figure
8.8a). Without this, the attack would have been successful in breaking
up the platoon as seen in figure 8.4a. However, the defence is still not
successful against an attack with 100% power. The shortcomings of the
double anchoring method are seen when all communication links are
attacked. The platoon is broken even under an 80% attack (figure 8.8b).
However, that attack is only successful, because double anchoring, leaves
the first link unprotected. This happens because there is only one preceding
vehicle, making this method impossible to apply for that link.
Given the above success but also the shortcomings of this method,
it was combined with the earlier implemented beamforming defence
(see section 8.1). As expected, the combination indeed provides better
resistance to jamming. The defence for the case of 80% power single node
attack, is successful as before (figure 8.8c). However, the platoon is now
more stable than plain double anchoring (compare to figure 8.8a) with the
maximum headway dropping from 15.86m to 13.77m. Plain beamforming
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had failed (compare to figure 8.4a) with a headway of 27.69m.
Attack profile Defence profile
Link Jammer
Omnidirectional
+ DA
Beamforming +
DA
BF with
sharpening + DA
2 80% 3 3 3
2 100% 7 3 3
all 80% 7/3 3 3
all 100% 7 7 3
Table 8.3: Double anchoring (DA) (stationary jammer)
7: defence failed 3: defence successful
Attack profile Defence profile
Link Jammer
Omnidirectional
+ DA
Beamforming +
DA
BF with
sharpening + DA
2 80% 7 7 3
2 100% 7 7 3
all 80% 7 7 3
all 100% 7 7 3
Table 8.4: Double anchoring (DA) (moving jammer)
7: defence failed 3: defence successful
The combined defence for the case of 80% power attack on all links
is also successful (figure 8.8d). This is a clear improvement over the
individual defences which had both failed (compare to figures 8.4d for
the beamforming and 8.8b for the double anchoring). However, even the
combined defence was not sufficient to defeat the 100% power attack.
The performance of the combined defence can be further improved by
using beam sharpening, in addition to beamforming. The 80% all link
attack is again defeated but this time, the platoon is more stable (figure
8.8e). This can be seen by the maximum headway dropping from 17.5m
to 16.13m (compare to 8.4e). The improvement is also clear in the case
of the 100% all link attack (figure 8.8f). Adding beam sharpening, makes
the combined defence strong enough to defeat the attack. It is also far
more stable to the case of plain beam sharpening with no double anchoring
(compare to 8.4f).
Table 8.4 shows the results of tests using a mobile jammer. Here
the interference persisted throughout the whole simulation. Simple
beamforming was not sufficient to defeat any of the previous attacks. Beam
sharpening however proved very effective and successfully defeated all the
attacks implemented.
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(a) link 2 80% omnidirectional (b) all links 80% omnidirectional
(c) link 2 80% beamforming (d) all links 80% beamforming
(e) all links 80% BF with sharpening (f) all links 100% BF with sharpening
Figure 8.8: Double anchoring headway plots (stationary jammer)
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8.2.3 Conclusion
Double anchoring was implemented and tested independently in several
scenarios. It successfully defended against low power attacks but
presented some shortcomings and was not sufficient on its own to defend
against high power attacks. Most importantly, this method can not be
applied to the first two vehicles which leaves the first link vulnerable to
jamming.
Combined with the beamforming method implemented in section
8.1, the results were promising. The platoon was able to resist to
stronger attacks, and be more stable than either of the techniques used
independently. Finally when used in combination with beamforming with
additional beam sharpening, the platoon was able to resist all of the attacks
implemented with relative ease (see table 8.3).
This method introduces a one-step delay to the response time of the
vehicles. In this simulations the time-step is 100 milliseconds which is a
considerable amount of time when vehicles are moving at high speeds.
This is however much faster than any human operator would be able
to react. Additionally, in a real-world application the time-step will
presumably be even orders of magnitude smaller, making the response
time almost instantaneous.
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8.3 GPS verification
GPS (Global Positioning System) verification refers to a vehicle that uses
data from its GPS module and map data to provide error correction and
warnings if it detects that it is deviating from the expected course of the
road. It is assumed that any vehicle capable of being a platoon member
will need to have a working GPS module and map data. GPS verification
is then a simple and inexpensive function to implement.
This provides an independent system to monitor the state of the vehicle
that is not subject to the same type of interference as inter-vehicular
communications. Because a GPS module can not provide very accurate
information, the error correction capabilities of this method are limited.
Nevertheless, it is considered a valuable tool for verifying the correctness
of platoon operation.
8.3.1 Implementation
As with double anchoring, this function is implemented in the ECU of the
vehicles. The flowchart in figure 8.9 outlines the operations taking place.
Figure 8.9: GPS verification flowchart
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In this setup, data from the GPS and map is collected and compared
with data received from the preceding vehicle. When a discrepancy is
detected between the map data and the vehicle course (e.g. when the
vehicle requests a turn but map data indicates that the road does not
contain a change of course in the immediate vicinity), the decision is
delayed for a step and the data from two time-steps are compared. If
the discrepancy is corrected by the second time-step, the first-step data is
discarded. If the discrepancy persists, then the GPS data is ignored but a
warning is generated to the driver and the whole platoon. Effectively this
is a two-out-of-three voting scheme, with the two votes being the current
and previous time-step and the third vote being the GPS data.
8.3.2 Results
For the scenarios analysed here, errors were forced rather than created by
random interference. This approach was selected to create a controlled
interference environment where this defence could have a measurable
effect. This would be able to be tested in the current attack scenarios
with measurable effects if the time steps were smaller and an e.g.
4-out-of-6 voting system was used. However there are limitations
with the current simulator set-up, the use of large time-steps and the
buffering procedure. Waiting for more time-steps for multiple votes would
compromise vehicular safety. Nevertheless, the layout of the simulator
would allow these changes to be easily implemented in the future.
A change of course is achieved by changing the acceleration of a vehicle.
This is the primary parameter that GPS verification monitors. In figure
8.10 the lateral acceleration of a vehicle is shown in different scenarios. In
all the scenarios the vehicle is presented with sudden lateral accelerations.
This is manually generated to test the effectiveness of GPS verification. In
scenarios (a) and (b), the accelerations are simple errors, that are corrected
on the next time-step. In scenario (c), the acceleration is persistent meaning
that it is either a persistent error or a valid request for a sudden change of
course (e.g. evasion of an obstacle). In the first scenario (see figure 8.10a)
GPS verification is inactive while in the second (see figure 8.10b) and third
(see figure 8.10c) it is activated.
As can be seen in the figures, with GPS verification inactive (figure
8.10a), any acceleration input is immediately accepted, as there is no way
of inferring whether it is valid or simply the result of a network error. This
would in the best case be a cause of discomfort to the passengers of the
vehicle. More importantly, it would be a serious safety issue as it would
destabilize the vehicle and the platoon.
When GPS verification is activated (figure 8.10b) one-step changes in
course that are not in agreement with the map data are voted off and so
are presumed to be erroneous and ignored. Nevertheless, a warning is
logged. When the warnings exceed a threshold, the driver and the platoon
are alerted (see figure 8.10d). When the acceleration input is persistent
and consistent in its values, it is presumed to be valid and performed as
requested (figure 8.10c)). A warning is again generated, alerting the driver
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and the platoon of the GPS data mismatch.
(a) single errors, GPS val. inactive (b) single errors, GPS val. activated
(c) persistent error, GPS val. activated (d) persistent error warning
Figure 8.10: GPS verification scenarios
8.3.3 Conclusion
GPS verification was implemented and manually tested (errors were forced
rather than created randomly by interference). It was demonstrated
that simple errors can be successfully mitigated based on GPS and map
data readily available to any vehicle capable of being a member of a
platoon. With the further improvements discussed above this would be
an invaluable method of increasing resistance to interference. Even in this
stage however, it proved very useful in error correction and pre-emptive
warning.
As with double anchoring (see chapter 8.2) this method introduces a
one-step delay to the response time of the vehicles. In this simulations
the time-step is 100 milliseconds which is a considerable amount of time
when vehicles are moving at high speeds. This is however much faster than
any human operator would be able to react. Additionally, in a real-world
application the time-step will presumably be even orders of magnitude
smaller, making the response time almost instantaneous.
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8.4 On-board sensors verification
There are several technologies designed to monitor the state of a vehicle
through on-board sensors and provide comfort and safety. In this section,
a Lane Departure Warning System (LDWS) is simulated and its usefulness
in a vehicle platoon encountering interference is examined.
As with GPS verification (see section 8.3) this will provide an independ-
ent system to monitor the state of the vehicle that is not subject to the same
type of interference as inter-vehicular communications. LDWS was selec-
ted because it is representative of similar technologies being developed
aimed at vehicle monitoring and it is already widely offered by manufac-
turers. Because it is examined in isolation and in a simplified way the error
correction capabilities of this method are limited. Nevertheless, it is con-
sidered a valuable tool for verifying the correctness of platoon operation.
Moreover conclusions drawn from these tests can help envision the useful-
ness of similar technologies, either used independently or in combination
with GPS and LDWS.
8.4.1 Implementation
As with double anchoring and GPS verification, this function is implemen-
ted in the ECU of the vehicles. The flowchart in figure 8.11 outlines the
operations taking place.
Figure 8.11: Lane Departure Warning System flowchart
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In this setup, data from the LDWS is collected and compared with
data received from the preceding vehicle. This includes information
from the system’s sensors (video, laser or infra-red, depending on the
implementation) and acceleration data. Based on this information, LDWS
can detect imminent lane changes before they happen. Because a platoon
will mostly operate on the same lane, when the LDWS is triggered, a
warning is logged and the movement is delayed for one time-step. The
data from the next time-step is compared and if it agrees with the previous,
the vehicle follows through and a lane change is initiated. If however the
data has changed and a lane change is no longer requested, it is assumed
that the lane change was uncommanded because of erroneous data. In this
case the data is discarded and the error is avoided.
Specifically for the case when the vehicle is travelling in a straight line,
only a warning is issued because the vehicle can not decide on the correct
turn without input from the platoon. This is because this scenario is based
on a simple implementation of an LDWS that can only issue warnings. In
future versions it would be possible to implement a more advanced system
with lane following capabilities.
8.4.2 Results
As in section 8.3, to test this method, a simplified scenario was run. In this
scenario, errors were forced rather than created by random interference.
This was done because the fully functional LDWS was not implemented
in code as it is outside the scope of the current work. Instead, a simulated
LDWS input was created and tested against these controlled, forced errors.
In the example of the scenario of an uncommanded lane change while
the platoon is travelling at a straight line, the system did indeed identify
the discrepancy and logged a warning, as expected (see figure 8.12).
Figure 8.12: Lane Departure Warning
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8.4.3 Conclusion
On-board sensors verification was implemented and manually tested
(errors were forced rather than created randomly by interference). It was
demonstrated that simple errors can be successfully mitigated based on
systems utilizing on-board sensors, readily available to any vehicle capable
of being a member of a platoon. Even with the simple setup tested in this
section, it proved very useful in error correction and pre-emptive warning.
As with double anchoring (see chapter 8.2) and GPS verification (see
chapter 8.3) this method introduces a one-step delay to the response time
of the vehicles. In this simulations the time-step is 100 milliseconds
which is a considerable amount of time when vehicles are moving at high
speeds. This is however much faster than any human operator would be
able to react. Additionally, in a real-world application the time-step will
presumably be even orders of magnitude smaller, making the response
time almost instantaneous.
Despite this delay, this method provides a net benefit for platoon safety.
Similar sensors now commonly found in many cars can be combined in a
similar way to provide even stronger error correction and warnings. Such
sensors could include front and rear radars, infra-red cameras and road
sign detectors. In the future this category could be expanded to include
systems that may allow identification, localization and characterization of
other platoons and vehicles on the road.
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Part III
Conclusion
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Vehicular networks have the potential of being one of the most
important applications of Ad hoc networking. The scale and special
nature of such a network presents several challenges in regards to
communications and security that need to be addressed in this new
perspective.
In a vehicle platoon, safety is the primary consideration. There is
need for a resilient Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) in the presence
of interference and other potential problems that induce errors in the
communication process. This can be achieved by conventional anti-
jamming techniques as well as exploitation of the special nature of this
specific application (use of on-board sensors, monitoring the state of the
VANET members, independent of the network state).
There is a need for a simple and expandable simulator that can take into
account the multiple variables in this application.
The following chapters examine the main conclusions of this work, how
it addresses the issues raised by the literature review and how it meets
the objectives initially set in chapter 2. Namely chapter 9 summarizes
the development of the proposed simulator, chapter 10 summarizes
the defences implemented and tested to enhance VANET resilience to
interference and chapter 11 summarizes the potential areas of future
development for this project.
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Chapter 9
Model
Using MATLAB and Simulink, a model was created to simulate a number
of aspects of a vehicle platoon:
• the physical operation of the platoon
This includes the independent operation of vehicles as well as their
ability to follow other vehicles based on data from the network
• the operation of the Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET)
Transmission and reception through the wireless medium, commu-
nication protocols etc.
• possible interference to the wireless communication
Physical and network simulation of interference sources (static or
mobile)
• the effect of interference on the VANET and the platoon
Examination of the physical operation as well as the performance of
the network under the effects of interference
The choice to create a new simulation environment was made after
a survey of the existing solutions. It was decided that a platform
incorporating both the physical and the network aspect of the simulation
in a simple solution would be sufficient for this project and an opportunity
to better understand the workings of both aspects. It is also the hope of
the author that it will attract further development beyond the scope of this
project.
The environment consists of two main parts. The simulator itself and
the post-processing suite (P3D) used to analyse and display simulation
data.
Any number of vehicles can be simulated. In this project 4 vehicles
were used, a leader and three followers. This number was selected to
allow the examination of dynamic correlations between the vehicles: with
four vehicles, there can be a lead vehicle, two intermediate vehicles (if the
interaction between intermediate vehicles needs to be examined), and one
end vehicle.
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On-board sensors can be simulated on a basic level with ease. In
this project a GPS module was implemented as well as a Lane Departure
Warning System to demonstrate the principal of using on-board sensor
verification.
The network simulation is independent to the vehicles. This allows
for plugging in different communication protocols simulated in MAT-
LAB/Simulink or exporting of vehicle data to a separate network simu-
lator.
The post-processing suite is easily configurable to present any data
generated by the simulator. It incorporates an animation function,
providing comprehensive presentation of the platoon’s operation.
The whole platform can be used, expanded and modified appropriately
to address future projects on the subject of vehicular networks.
Several validation profiles were used to demonstrate the simulator’s
operation and ability of simulating the needed scenarios. The theoretically
expected results were verified using P3D.
Given the construction of this novel simulation environment and its
successful use in action, it is the hope of the author that it may be used
and developed further in the future and form the basis for further research
into the subject.
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Chapter 10
Defences
Using the newly developed simulator, a number of jamming attacks were
implemented:
• Stationary jammer
A jammer with varying transmission power is placed along the route
of the platoon
• Mobile jammer
A jammer with varying transmission power tracks the platoon leader
throughout its route
Based on the initial findings and the literature review, defence methods
were implemented and examined:
• Beamforming
manipulation of the transmit/receive beam of the vehicles based
on the vehicles’ and interference sources’ positions allows great
improvements to the Signal-to-Noise ratio
• Double anchoring
vehicles can communicate with and use movement data from mul-
tiple members of the platoon to verify their state and the validity of
received information
• Global Positioning System verification
vehicles can use their GPS module to verify their state and validity of
received information
• On-board sensor verification
vehicles can use their various on-board sensors to verify their state
and validity of received information. As an example of an on-board
system, a Lane Departure Warning System was simulated
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The defences were examined independently and in combination. The
results were encouraging in all cases and showed great potential for
mitigating interference.
Beamforming in its simple form successfully defended against low
power attacks on a single link but was not sufficient against more advanced
or powerful attacks. An improvement that allowed the beam to be
sharpened it the presence of high interference, gave promising results. The
platoon was able to resist stronger attacks, and be more stable than before.
Even the strongest attack was unsuccessful in breaking the platoon, even
though it tested this defence method to its limits.
Double anchoring successfully defended against low power attacks but
presented some shortcomings and was not sufficient on its own to defend
against high power attacks. This method cannot be applied to the first two
vehicles of the platoon which leaves the first link vulnerable to jamming.
Combined with beamforming however the results were very promising.
The platoon was able to resist to stronger attacks, and be more stable than
either of the techniques used independently. With beam sharpening, the
platoon was able to resist all of the attacks implemented with relative ease.
GPS verification demonstrated that simple errors can be successfully
mitigated based on GPS and map data, readily available to any vehicle
capable of being a member of a platoon. It proved very useful in error
correction and pre-emptive warning and is open to future improvement.
On-board sensors verification demonstrated that simple errors can be
successfully mitigated based on systems utilizing on-board sensors, readily
available to any vehicle capable of being a member of a platoon. It proved
very useful in error correction and pre-emptive warning and is open to
future improvement.
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Chapter 11
Future Work
The project has been successful in the goals set in chapter 2 and also opens
the possibility of expanding on the developed simulation environment to
examine scenarios of increasing complexity. The following proposals could
be considered for future work:
• The physical model to simulate the vehicle motions has been
constructed to a level sufficient for the predetermined scenarios used
in this project.
• While the model is already customizable, future work could include
improvements to the physical model to accommodate easier custom-
ization of the simulation parameters. This could include modelling
based on the true bearing and velocity of the vehicle, compared to
the use of Cartesian acceleration and coordinates used here.
• A user friendly interface for defining vehicle, interferer, network
profiles and other parameters of the simulation would be desirable.
Ideally, a GUI should be used to define all the simulation parameters
at the start of each run.
• At present, simulation data and errors are manually recorded after
each run, using MATLAB error messages and the P3D suite. This
could be automated in the future, to create logs of each run’s data and
any errors or warnings. P3D could be integrated with the simulator
to allow run-time monitoring of the simulation and intuitive use.
In the future, run-time configuration (man-in-the-loop) could be
implemented to introduce infinite scenarios.
• Some parameters are statically defined by the user for the predeter-
mined scenarios in this project. All parameters should be exposed in
future versions to allow the dynamic simulation of more scenarios.
• In this project beamforming is only applied on the transmitter side.
Receiver beamforming can be easily added implemented.
• Given the customizability of this platform, multiple platoons, inde-
pendent vehicles, traffic modelling, road modelling, free will, com-
munication protocols
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• In this project, a single platoon was examined. In future iterations
inter platoon communication and interaction modes could be imple-
mented and tested.
• More attacks scenarios can be implemented, possibly combining
multiple stationary and mobile jammers with various jamming
profiles.
• More defence mechanisms can be implemented and more on-board
systems can be integrated and realistically modelled.
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Appendix A
Supplementary figures
This appendix contains additional figures created by P3D as a result of
several different simulation runs. As the full number of figures and
simulation runs is too large to be distributed on paper, only key figures
have been included:
• Vehicles route (sensors)
• Vehicles headway (sensors)
• Leader telemetry (sensors)
• Declination (vehicles 2, 3 and 4)
More figures are electronically available upon request.
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(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.1: Stationary jammer. Link 2 under attack. 80% power.
Omnidirectional.
(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.2: Stationary jammer. Link 2 under attack. 80% power.
Beamforming.
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(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.3: Stationary jammer. Link 2 under attack. 100% power.
Beamforming.
(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.4: Stationary jammer. All links under attack. 80% power.
Omnidirectional.
97
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(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.5: Stationary jammer. All links under attack. 80% power.
Beamforming.
(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.6: Stationary jammer. All links under attack. 100% power.
Beamforming with beam-sharpening.
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(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.7: Stationary jammer. Link 2 under attack. 80% power.
Omnidirectional and double anchoring.
(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.8: Stationary jammer. Link 2 under attack. 80% power.
Beamforming and double anchoring.
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(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.9: Stationary jammer. Link 2 under attack. 100% power.
Beamforming and double anchoring.
(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.10: Stationary jammer. All links under attack. 80% power.
Omnidirectional and double anchoring.
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(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.11: Stationary jammer. All links under attack. 80% power.
Beamforming and double anchoring.
(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.12: Stationary jammer. All links under attack. 100% power.
Beamforming with beam-sharpening and double anchoring.
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(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.13: Moving jammer. Link 2 under attack. 80% power.
Beamforming.
(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.14: Moving jammer. All links under attack. 80% power.
Beamforming.
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Figure A.15: Moving jammer. All links under attack. 100% power.
Beamforming.
(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.16: Moving jammer. All links under attack. 100% power.
Beamforming with beam-sharpening.
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(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.17: Moving jammer. Link 2 under attack. 80% power.
Beamforming and double anchoring.
(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.18: Moving jammer. All links under attack. 80% power.
Beamforming and double anchoring.
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(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.19: Moving jammer. All links under attack. 100% power.
Beamforming and double anchoring.
(a) Route (b) Headway (c) Leader telemetry
(d) Declination (veh. 2) (e) Declination (veh. 3) (f) Declination (veh. 4)
Figure A.20: Moving jammer. All links under attack. 100% power.
Beamforming with beam-sharpening and double anchoring.
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